Affirming justice, equity and compassion in all our relations
Nate is an advanced doctoral student at Columbia University in an interdisciplinary program of Law, Education & Religion. His dissertation, excerpted below, asks the question,
Should public school teachers
leave their religious garb
at the schoolhouse gate?
Introduction
Before stepping onto school grounds, should public teachers who identify as Christians bury their cross necklaces in their shirts? Should educators who practice Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, and Sikhism leave their head coverings at the schoolhouse gate? To some the answer is unabashedly, “Yes – it is a compelling state interest to avoid religious endorsement in public schools by regulating teachers’ dress so that students do not perceive the state as endorsing religion and that students are protected from possible religious coercion.” Others respond with an impassioned, “No – although limited, teachers do not entirely give up their constitutional rights to free speech and free exercise of religion when becoming employees of the state. It is unlawful to discriminate based on religious practice and unpatriotic to teach students that the United States is hostile to religion.”
I designed this dissertation to explore whether regulating the religious expression of public school teachers is in fact “hostile” or whether it is a reasonable way for policymakers to prevent the perception of a sectarian public school. Different worldviews will result in different responses; however, most can agree that the issue of public school teachers’ religious expression derives from the inexorable tension between the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses of the First Amendment. History reveals that this tension is not easily alleviated.
I. a. Historical Debates
The historical debates about teachers’ religious garb remain unresolved today.[1] In 1894 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the First Amendment rights of a Catholic nun to wear a habit in the public classroom.[2] Specifically, the Court held that the garb-wearing Catholic nuns teaching in public schools did not constitute sectarian teaching unless the nuns explicitly conveyed religious instruction during school hours. In response to this unpopular ruling, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted a religious garb statute prohibiting public school teachers from wearing “any dress, mark, emblem or insignia indicating… that such teacher is a member or adherent of any religious order, sect or denomination” and providing criminal penalties for any public school administrator who fails to suspend or terminate the offending teacher after notice of a violation. [3]
Fifteen years later the garb statute was challenged;[4] however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the statute did not violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution or the titles and freedom of conscience provisions of the state constitution. The anti-garb statute was then reenacted in 1949, updated in 1982, and remains in effect today. By the end of World War II, Pennsylvania was one of thirty-six states to legally ban teachers’ religious clothing.[5] Today, it remains one of three states with anti-garb laws, along with Nebraska and North Dakota (Table 1).
Table 1. States prohibiting public school teachers from wearing religious garb.
From 1906 to 1965, in states where no garb statutes existed at the time, the courts in Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, North Dakota, and Ohio all permitted Catholic teachers to wear habits,[6] whereas the courts in Nebraska, New Mexico and New York did not.[7] My intention is to use the full dissertation to explore the historical rationales used by these courts in the context of the current discourse.
I. b. Contemporary Debates
More recent rulings on teachers’ religious garb are equally inconsistent in their application of constitutional law. For instance, in 1986 the Third Circuit and in 1992 the Oregon State Supreme courts upheld the dismissal of Sikh[8] and Muslim[9] teachers for wearing head coverings.[10] On the contrary, in 2003 a District Court for Western Pennsylvania overturned the decision to dismiss a teacher’s aid for wearing a cross necklace.[11] Interestingly, last year the Oregon Legislative Assembly repealed their 87-year-old ban on religious garb in public classrooms (Table 2), whereas Arkansas and Tennessee recently enacted statutes that permit public school teachers to wear religious garb[12] (Table 3).
Table 2. Oregon first enacted then repealed a religious garb law.
Table 3. States permitting public school teachers to wear religious garb.
To this day, the state laws vary and the case law remains contradictory – a ripe problem for the U.S. Supreme Court to address some day. Until then, public officials are required to juggle four compelling, yet competing, state interests for public school teachers: free exercise of religion, non-establishment of religion, free speech,[13] and non-discrimination.
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the [right to] freedom of speech…” Proponents of anti-garb statutes intend to prevent the perception that public schools endorse or seek to establish a state religion. Critics argue that religious garb is a form of symbolic speech, which is dually protected by the free exercise and free speech clauses. Moreover, critics of anti-garb laws point to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, [14] which prevents publicly-funded employers from discriminating based on an employee’s religious observance or practice.
Notes
[1] See Reutter, Edmund E. (1992) Teachers’ Religious Dress: A Century of Litigation West’s Education Law Reporter, January 1992. And see Blum, Virgil C. Religious Liberty and the Religious Garb, and Religious Garb in the Public Schools: A Study in Conflicting Liberties. University of Chicago Law Review 22, no. 4 (Summer 1955): 875-88 and 888-95. Also see Liberty and Freedom of Conscience: Right to Wear a Religious Garb in Public Schools. Michigan Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Feb., 1911), pp. 352-353 f. And see Power to Regulate Teacher's Dress, The Virginia Law Register, Vol. 13, No. 8 (Dec., 1907), p. 645.
[2] See Hysong v. Gallitzin School District, 164 Pa. 629, 30 A. 482 (1894) and Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132, 78 A. 68 (1910).
[3] See Religious Garb in Public Schools: Discussion in the Pennsylvania House of Bill to Regulate the Attire of All the Teachers of the State, New York Times, March 7, 1895. And see George, Bucher (1908) The garb law: an argument on the Pennsylvania garb law in relation to public school teachers with replies by F.W. McGuire. In “Quarryville” p. 41, 1908. Microfiche call number: 84-B1 ATLA fiche 1990-5062.
[4] Commonwealth v. Herr, 78 A. 68 (Pa. 1910).
[5] Pfeffer, Leo (1953) Church, State and Freedom. Boston: Beacon Press, reprinted 1967, p 413.
[6] For examples of states upholding the right of teachers to wear religious garb see Kwowlton v. Baumhover, 166 N.W.202 (Iowa 1918); Gerhardt v. Heid, 267 N.W.127 (N.D. 1936); Johnson v. Boyd, 28 N.E.2d 256 (Ind. 1940); City of New Haven v. Town of Torrington, 43 A.2d 455 (Conn. 1945); Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. 1956); Moore v. Bd. Of Education, 212 N.E.2d 833 (Ohio 1965);
[7] O’Connor v. Hedrick, 184 N.Y.421, 77 N.E.612 (1906) upheld religious garb regulation as a reasonable ordinance not inconsistent with the laws or policies of the state. See also State ex rel. Public School District No. 6 v. Taylor, 122 Neb. 454, 240 N.W. 573 (1932). Also see Zellers v. Huff, 236 P.2d 949 (N.M. 1951), which barred Catholic teachers from wearing religious garb.
[8] Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 41, 301 Ore. 358 (1986), app. Dismissed, 480 U.S. 942 (1987).
[9] Holly M. Bastian offers an extensive treatment of the U.S. v. Board of Education case, where the Third Circuit upheld the dismissal of Alima Delores Reardon, a Muslim teacher employed in the School District of Philadelphia. Bastian, Holly M. (1992) Religious Garb Statutes and Title VII: An Uneasy Coexistence, 80 Geo. L.J. 211, 1991-1992.
[10] Professor Jacqueline Stefkovich explores cases where Muslim and Sikh teachers were dismissed because they refused to refrain from wearing traditional religious clothing at school. She reviews religious garb statutes in several states in relation to First Amendment rights and a pluralistic society and concludes that religious dress is protected by freedom of expression guarantees. Stefkovich, Jacqueline A. (1992) Religious Garb in the Schools: A Different Time, A Different Place. Religion & Public Education. v19 n1 p43-46 Win 1992.
[11] Nichol v. Arin Intermediate Unit 28, 268 F. Supp. 2d 536 (W.D. Pa. 2003)
[12] Haynes, Charles C. (2003) The First Amendment in schools: a guide from the First Amendment Center, Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, p. 100.
[13] It should be noted that public employees have limited free speech rights, as discussed later in the exam (See Hazelwood School District et al. v. Kuhlmeier et al., 484 U.S. 260, 1988 and Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 2006).
[14] Title VII § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988) reads, “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . .” In 1972, Title VII was amended and section 7010 was added: “The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.”
© 2012 Created by Rev. Nate Walker.